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Abstract:  
We present results from a field experiment designed to measure the importance of 
managerial commitment to a contract within a firm that pays its workers piece rates. In 
the tree planting industry the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of 
the difficulty of the terrain to be planted. During the experiment, workers began planting 
a terrain at a trial piece rate, but were told this rate would be revised upwards if, after a 
few work days, average productivity was below that observed on a similar (control) 
terrain on which the firm had committed to the contract. Our results suggest that worker 
productivity was 20% to 40% lower in the absence of commitment. The reduction was 
less pronounced when workers had less time to benefit from any subsequent increase in 
the piece rate. This provides support for models of worker turnover as a means of 
overcoming ratchet effects. 
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1 Introduction
Economic theory highlights the role of contractual commitment in determining the success of
regulatory and incentive schemes in dynamic settings (Baron and Besanko, 1987; Laont and
Tirole, 1988). In the absence of commitment, contracts can be rened by principals to take
advantage of the new information as it is revealed through production. This feedback induces
forward looking agents to strategically withhold production (and information), anticipating
its eect on their future payments or prots. The link between contracts and past performance
has become known as the "ratchet principle" (Weitzman, 1980). The resulting ineciency (or
ratchet eect) in implementing piece-rate contracts has been blamed for their relative scarcity
in the real economy; see Gibbons (1987) for a discussion and references. Yet economic theory
also suggests institutions to counteract the ratchet eect in the absence of commitment.
Ickes and Samuelson (1987) have shown that rotating workers across economic environments
can be benecial when information asymmetries exist over conditions that aect productivity.
Rotating workers breaks the feedback from current output to future contracts for a particular
worker, reducing the incentive to withhold output. 1 Little is known as to either the economic
importance of the ratchet eect in the real economy, or the ability of worker rotation to
overcome these eects.
This paper measures the empirical importance of commitment and the ability of rotating
workers to overcome the ratchet eect in the absence of commitment. We exploit a eld
experiment, conducted within a real economic rm to measure these eects. During the
experiment the level of commitment to a contract was exogenously varied, allowing us to
measure worker behaviour with and without commitment. We concentrate on worker output,
measuring the extent to which workers withhold output in an eort to inuence future piece
rates. The experiment also varies the amount of time that workers expect to spend under
revised future piece rates to identify the eect of worker rotation.
The experiment took place in a tree-planting rm that pays its workers piece rates. These
workers plant trees on blocks of land that vary in the steepness and rockiness of the terrain.
Typically, the piece rate paid to workers is determined as a function of the conditions on the
terrain. Steep or rocky ground is more dicult to plant and slows planters down, forcing the
rm to raise the piece rate to attract workers. These conditions are typically sampled by the
manager before planting begins. The rm then commits to the piece-rate for the duration of
planting on the block. During the experiment workers were told that the manager had not
1When information asymmetries exist over worker ability other institutions include developing worker
commitment to stay in the rm (Lazear, 1986), and a well-functioning outside market for experienced workers
(Kanemoto and Macleod, 1992).
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had time to sample the conditions on a particular (treatment) block, although he thought
that they were similar to a (control) block that had been planted two weeks prior, under
commitment to the piece-rate. In fact, the control and treatment blocks had been chosen
by the manager as representing identical planting conditions. The workers were further told
that the piece rate would be set on the treatment block at 16 cents per tree (the piece rate
they had received on the control block) but if average productivity on the rst two days of
planting was below that on the control block, the piece rate would be increased, retroactively.
This was repeated twice, on blocks of diering size. In both cases workers were told they
would be planting on the treatment block until that block was completed: 10 days on the
large block and 6 days on the small block.
We use the experimental data to measure the workers' reaction to a lack of commitment
to the contract on the part of the rm. Since the control and treatment blocks were iden-
tical, any increase in the piece rate represents rents to the workers. We present theoretical
results showing conditions under which forward-looking workers will withhold output on the
treatment block (in the absence of commitment) in an eort to inuence the piece rate and
capture those rents. Rent-seeking behaviour is amplied on the larger block since the rents
are enjoyed for a longer period of time. This is the eect of rotation. In the limit rents
disappear by eliminating the second period and workers perfectly reveal conditions.
We compare daily productivity by the same workers on the treatment and control blocks
to measure the empirical importance of contractual commitment. Our results show that
combined productivity on both blocks decreased by 19% in the absence of commitment.
This is consistent with recent studies which have considered the empirical importance of
the ratchet eect in other settings (Charness, Kuhn and Villeval, 2011; Macartney, 2011;
Levenson, Zoghi, Gibbs, and Benson, 2011). Our results also show that workers were less
inclined to withhold output on the small block (a decrease of 15% versus 30% on the long
block), suggesting that rotation can be an eective tool in overcoming the ratchet eect in
the absence of commitment.
Finally, our results show that workers withheld more output on the second and third days
of planting on the treatment block than on the rst. Since workers had a better opportunity
to communicate with each other after the rst day of planting, this is consistent with workers
cooperating in revealing conditions to the rm, something that our theoretical model assumes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes institutional
details of the tree-planting industry and the rm in which the experiment was conducted.
Section 2 presents the design of the experiment. Section ?? presents the model. Section 3
presents the data and our main empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Experimental design
The experiment took place on two separate treatment planting blocks, denoted TL and TS ,
both planted in June, 2010. These blocks diered in size and the number of planters assigned
to them. Block L was planted by 8 planters and was scheduled to be planted over a period
of 10 days.2 Block S had 15 planters assigned to it and was scheduled to be planted over a
period of 5 days. Both TL and TS blocks would normally have been planted at a piece rate
of $0.16 per tree.
Prior to the experiment the manager chose a control block for each of treatment block,
matched on the basis of planting conditions. These are denoted CL (matched to TL) and CS
(matched to TS), respectively. The control blocks were each planted under commitment {
the manager announced the piece rate (as usual) at the beginning of planting on the block.
The piece rate was $0.16 per tree.
Prior to planting on each of the experimental blocks, the workers were told by the manager
that he had not yet viewed the block in detail and hence had not set a piece rate. They were
further told that the manager thought the land was similar to the control block and would
therefore start them planting at the same piece rate as had been paid on the control block.
They were also told that the manager would check production levels after 2 or 3 days3 and
would increase the piece rate if average production was below that observed on the control
block; the increased piece rate would then apply (retroactively) for all planting performed on
the treatment block. Finally, the manager told the planters how many days they would be
on planting on the block: 10 days for TL and 5 days for TC . The amount by which the rate
would be increased was left unspecied.
An important aspect of our design is that workers were unaware that they were par-
ticipating in an experiment.4 This allowed us to observe their reaction in the absence of
commitment within their natural work environment. To this end, planters were told that
the treatment blocks had just recently been added to the contract, giving the manager little
time for detailed viewing of the conditions of the terrain. What is more, the manager was
not going to have time to view the terrain in detail during the next few days as he was busy
viewing other terrains.5
The manager was also instructed to treat the experimental days as normal working days:
2The block was unexpectedly expanded to include neighbouring land once the non-commitment faze was
completed. This gave 7 extra days of planting (and observations).
3Two days of comparison were used on treatment block S and three days on treatment block L.
4This is common practice in eld experiments; see, for example, Gneezy and List, 2006.
5None of the planters questioned this explanation. The reality of the explanation also kept the planters
unaware of the fact that economists nanced the experiment.
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planters worked the same number of hours as a regular workday and were monitored in the
same way.
3 Data Analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables of our experiment. As discussed
in Section 2, the piece-rate on both blocks was kept constant at 0.16$ during the control and
treatment periods and was increased retroactively to 0.20$ during the post treatment period.
We next present statistics separately for control, trial, and post trial periods on both the
short and long blocks. Average earnings during the trial periods are reported in the table on
the basis of the initial piece-rate (0.16$) and thus do not take into account the retro-active
increase of the piece-rate.
Planting on the short block during the control and trial periods lasted two consecutive
days while planting during the post trial period lasted four days. The same 15 planters
worked during all three periods. While all 15 planters worked both days of the control and
trial periods, the number of days spent working during the post trial period varied across
planters { 10 planters worked all 4 days, 4 planters worked 3 days, and one planter worker a
single day.
We measure planter productivity using their daily number of trees planted. Average
planter productivity during the control period on the short block was 1667 trees per day. This
number dropped to 1565 trees per day during the trial period. A Mann-Whitney test suggests
that this drop is not signicant at conventional levels, suggesting small and insignicant
strategic behavior on the part of workers. Average productivity during the post trial period
was 1910 trees per day. Mann-Whitney tests indicate that productivity during the post trial
period is greater than productivity during the trial period (p-value = 0.003) and also during
the control period (p-value = 0.034). In the next section we will extend our statistical analysis
to control for extraneous factors on productivity, such as temperature and rainfall.
Planting on the long block during the control, trial, and post trial periods lasted 5, 3, and
10 days respectively. Planters varied with respect to the number of days worked during each
of the three periods. Planters worked between 1 and 5 days under the control conditions,
and between 2 and 3 days during the trial period, and between 12 and 17 days during the
post trial period. Average daily worker productivity during the control period on the long
block was 1821 trees. Productivity signicantly dropped to 1245 during the trial period
(Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.000). This suggests the existence of important ratchet
eects. We note that the drop in productivity during trial period is greater on the long block
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than on the short block. This is consistent with workers having more incentives to reduce
output during trial on the long block since they can benet from a (potential) piece-rate
increase for a longer period of time. Productivity during the post trial period on the long
block signicantly increased to 1649 trees per day relative to the trial period (Mann-Whitney
test, p-value = 0.000). Interestingly, the level of productivity during the post trial period
remained signicantly below productivity during the control period (Mann-Whitney test,
p-value = 0.015). This productivity decrease occurred despite workers receiving a higher
piece-rate during the post trial period than during the control period.
While the general conditions of the terrain are kept constant across all three periods of the
experiment, planting conditions may have been aected by varying weather conditions. To
account for weather eects we collected data on maximum and minimum daily temperatures
as well as daily rainfall in proximity to all blocks. We nd that average minimal daily
temperatures varied by approximately 2 degrees across periods. There is a slightly higher
variation in the average maximum daily temperatures across periods. We nd that the trial
period on the short block coincided with the highest maximal temperatures (approximately
5 degrees (Celsius) higher than during the control period) while the trial period on the
long block coincides with the lowest average maximal temperatures (approximately 5 degrees
(Celsius) lower than during the control period). Finally, the control period on the short block
and the trial period on the long block received more rain than did other periods. We will
take the possible eects of weather on productivity into account when analyzing the eects
of incentives on productivity during our experiment.
To measure the importance of commitment in an unrestricted framework we specify the
following linear panel data regression model
treesit = x
0
it + i + t + "it (1)
where treesit denotes the daily number of trees planted on day t by planter i, xit denotes
a vector of exogenous variables, i denotes a planter-specic, time-invariant productivity
parameter, t capture day-specic conditions, and "it denotes unobservable factors which
vary across days and planters. We treat i as planter xed eects while the composite term
t + "it is treated as a random eect assumed to be mean independent of the other variables
entering the model.
We consider two specications of this model, which dier with respect to the variables in
xit. Our baseline model species xit as a function of a Trial binary variable taking a value of
1 when planting occurs during the trial period on the treatment block (0 otherwise), a Post
trial binary variable taking a value of 1 when planting occurs during the post trial period on
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the treatment block (0 otherwise), and three weather variables (daily maximal temperature,
daily minimal temperature, and daily rainfall).
We highlighted in section 2 the possibility that planters coordinate their eorts better
on the second day (and the third day for the long block) of the trial period. Our extended
specication is specied to test whether ratchet eects are dierent between rst day and the
other days spent working under treatment conditions. We do so by adding interaction terms
between Trial and dummy variables indicating the second and (for the long block) third days
of work under the trial conditions.
Table 2 presents the results for both specications. The rst two columns of the table
contain the results of both specications obtained by pooling data from both blocks. We
nd that productivity during the trial period is signicantly lower than during the control
period (or reference category) by an average of 359 trees per planter per day. This represents
a 19% productivity decrease relative to the control period during which the rm was com-
mitted to the piece rate. We do not nd that productivity during the post-trial period diers
signicantly from productivity under control, an indication that workers increased their pro-
ductivity (relative to the trial period) after the piece-rate was increased. Results from the
extended specication do not suggest that behavior during trial diered across the days of
the trial. In particular, interactions of Trial with the dummy variables for the days of work
during trial are not individually signicant at conventional levels.
The remainder of the table presents results for each block, separately. We nd that average
daily planter productivity during the trial period on the short block is 265 trees lower than
during the control period (p-value = 0.035). This represents a decrease in productivity of
15.25% relative to the control period. Our extended specication for the short block reveals
that workers withheld output mostly during the second day of work during the trial period.
In particular, the leading treatment variable is not signicantly dierent from zero while
average productivity during the second day of trial is predicted to be 329 trees lower than
during the control period (p-value = 0.023). These results are consistent with workers being
able to coordinate better their actions after the rst day of trial.
Results for the baseline specication on the long block reveal substantially stronger ratchet
eects. We nd that average daily worker productivity is predicted to be 571 trees lower
during the trial period than during the control period (p-value = 0.000). This represents a
decrease in productivity of of 39.6% relative to the control period, approximately twice the
size of the eect measured on the short block.
The behaviour of workers during the post-trial period is more mixed in terms of supporting
the model's predictions. In general, average daily worker productivity during the post-trial
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period is signicantly greater than during the trial period, which conrms that workers
took advantage of the increased piece rates to earn rents. However, productivity is not
signicantly greater than during the control period. This suggests that workers did not
reveal true conditions during the post-trial period as predicted by the model. In failing to
do so, they forwent some rents. This may be due to the fact that workers were reluctant to
reveal to the rm that they had acted untruthfully during the trial period in order to induce
an increase in the piece rate, perhaps fearing future repercussions from doing so.6
The leading Trial variable in our extended specication is negative and signicant, sug-
gesting that workers on the long block withheld output during the rst day of trial (by 544
trees). This diers from results on the short block where we found no signicant dierences
in productivity between the rst day of trial relative to the control period. This dierence
can be explained by at least two factors. First, workers on the long block may have been
reacting individually more to the absence of contractual commitment during the rst day of
trial given the higher potential benets of doing so. Second, coordination between workers
on the rst day of trial may have been more feasible on the long block given the relatively
smaller crew size. Finally, we nd that average worker output was signicantly lower during
the second day of trial than on the rst (by 85 trees). This is again consistent with workers
coordinating to reduce output.
Our data contains limited background variables on workers, including their age and their
number of ongoing years of tenure with the rm. Average age of workers in our experiment
is 28.7, with a minimum age of 19 and a maximum age of 46. The average number of years of
tenure of workers in the experiment is 2.7, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 11. We
next explore the relationship between these variables and behavior during the trial period.
We do so by adding interactions between these variables and our trial variable. Table 3
presents the results. We nd that age and tenure do not signicantly aect behavior during
the trial period on the short block. However, we nd a signicant positive eect of age on
productivity during trial on the long block. This suggests that older workers withheld less
output than younger workers during trial. As with the short block, we nd that tenure has
no signicant eect on productivity during trial on the long block.
6Income eects or reference dependent preferences may also play a role. Income eects would imply that
workers substitute eort for on-the-job leisure as the rm raises the piece-rate paid. Reference-dependent
preferences imply that the marginal utility of income decreases once earnings exceed a worker-specic target.
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4 Conclusion
We provided direct evidence that contractual commitment and worker turnover can be eec-
tive to deal with the negative eects of workers behaving strategically in the presence of moral
hazard. In particular, removing contractual commitment reduced overall worker average out-
put by 19%. Moreover, workers withheld output more the the greater they could benet
from their perceived information asymmetry. Overall, the loss in productivity associated
with removing contractual commitment represented between 15% and 40% of productivity
levels measured under contractual commitment.
An intriguing nding has been that workers continued to withhold output beyond the
trial period in the experiment. This output reduction is also sizeable and reached at least
16% on the long treatment block. It is noteworthy that this reduction in output occurred
despite workers knew the rm would return to its normal practice of maintaining contrac-
tual commitment on future blocks. Hence, this output reduction cannot be explained by
workers strategically trying to inuence their future compensation. We highlighted at least
three possible mechanisms to explain this behavior: income eects, income targeting, and
apprehension of future sanctions. Disentangling these mechanisms merits further analysis.
Regardless of the mechanism however, our results suggest that removing contractual commit-
ment will aect negatively worker behavior even after the rms raises worker compensation
in order to increase their productivity.
8
S
h
o
rt
bl
oc
k
L
o
n
g
bl
oc
k
C
on
tr
ol
T
ri
a
l
P
o
st
tr
ia
l
C
o
n
tr
o
l
T
ri
a
l
P
o
st
tr
ia
l
A
v
er
ag
e
tr
ee
s
p
la
n
te
d
16
67
.1
67
1
5
6
5
.8
3
3
1
9
1
0
.4
7
2
1
8
2
1
.4
0
6
1
2
4
5
.5
5
6
1
6
4
9
.7
6
2
A
v
er
ag
e
d
ai
ly
ea
rn
in
gs
26
6.
74
6
2
5
0
.5
3
3
3
8
2
.0
9
4
2
9
1
.4
2
5
1
9
9
.2
8
9
3
2
9
.9
5
4
P
ie
ce
-r
at
e
0.
16
0
.1
6
0
.2
0
0
.1
6
0
.1
6
0
.2
0
N
u
m
b
er
of
w
or
ke
rs
15
1
5
1
5
8
8
8
N
u
m
b
er
of
p
la
n
ti
n
g
d
ay
s
2
2
4
5
3
1
7
A
v
er
ag
e
m
in
im
al
te
m
p
er
at
u
re
6.
75
0
8
.6
5
0
8
.1
4
5
5
.9
2
7
8
.4
1
8
8
.1
3
3
A
v
er
ag
e
m
ax
im
al
te
m
p
er
at
u
re
16
.7
50
2
1
.7
5
0
1
8
.8
3
0
2
2
.4
8
7
1
7
.6
4
5
1
9
.5
5
6
A
v
er
ag
e
ra
in
in
m
il
li
m
et
er
s
4.
80
0
2
.9
0
0
2
.4
1
1
3
.2
2
0
6
.0
1
8
3
.2
6
7
T
ab
le
1:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
d
u
ri
n
g
co
n
tr
ol
,
tr
ia
l,
an
d
p
os
t
tr
ia
l
p
er
io
d
s
o
f
th
e
ex
p
er
im
en
t
o
n
b
o
th
sh
o
rt
a
n
d
lo
n
g
b
lo
ck
s.
A
v
er
a
g
e
te
m
p
er
at
u
re
s
ar
e
m
ea
su
re
d
in
d
eg
re
es
C
el
si
u
s
an
d
av
er
ag
e
ra
in
p
re
ci
p
it
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
in
m
il
li
m
et
er
s.
A
v
er
a
g
e
ea
rn
in
g
s
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
tr
ia
l
p
er
io
d
s
ar
e
co
m
p
u
te
d
on
th
e
b
as
is
of
th
e
in
it
ia
l
p
ie
ce
-r
a
te
a
n
d
d
o
n
o
t
ta
k
e
in
to
a
cc
o
u
n
t
th
e
re
tr
o
-a
ct
iv
e
in
cr
ea
se
o
f
th
e
p
ie
ce
-r
at
e.
9
Short block Long block
Constant 1737.900*** 1723.259*** 1442.826*** 1457.678***
(132.229) (188.765) (143.494) (149.135)
Trial -265.716** -42.617 -571.508*** -544.973***
(101.993) (103.230) (46.278) (37.749)
Trialday 2 -329.186** -96.029**
(113.371) (38.331)
Trialday 3 -22.209
(13.418)
Post trial -56.363 -18.563 -233.551*** -239.440***
(90.331) (105.048) (47.121) 50.833
Maxtemp -36.683 -51.108 -6.711 -7.764
(20.577) (20.642) 5.931 (6.366)
Mintemp 149.211** 174.336** 21.078*** 22.436***
(53.272) (53.361) 6.308 (7.001)
Rain -33.840 -15.885 -11.944*** -12.209***
(27.910) (28.582) (3.407) (3.651)
R-square 0.858 0.869 0.817 0.819
Table 2: Regression results for the short and long blocks. Dependent variable is number of
tress planted per day per worker. Individual planter xed eects were included in all regres-
sions but are omitted from the table. Numbers in parenthesis represent clustered standard
errors (at the day level) and are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity.
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